Taking a break from Rabbi Levine's book Case Studies in Jewish Ethics to examine a real case:
Question: A particular catering hall allows clients to bring in their own caterer and band. After an event when the band and caterer are packing up the band leader sees the caterer unplugging an extension chord. The chord is generic and has no noticable signs of identification. It is near an outlet that was used both for music equipment and for a warming tray. The band leader says the extension chord actually belongs to him. The caterer insists that it is his. There is no way to tell waht the chord was plugged into and both parties are not sure of how many chords they arrived with.
Does the caterer keep the chord because he was the first to grab it? Must he give it to the band leader? Must they split the cost?
Would it make a difference if the dispute was between the caterer and the manager of the facility?
Thursday, February 9, 2012
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
The 10 commandments according to Rashi
According to Rashi...
1. Why did Hashem introduce himself as "The God who took you our of Egypt" rather than the God who created the world?
2. If God's aspect of punishment is 'x' what is his aspect of kindness?
3. What is an example of taking Hashem's name in vain?
4. Besides "Guard" and "Remember" the Shabbat, give an example of two contradictory things that Hashem said simultaneously.
5. How does one "remember" the Shabbat?
6. How can you do all of your work in six days?
7. What Kal Vachomer is taught in the ten commandments?
8. What kind of theft is referred to by "don't steal?" How do we know?
1. Why did Hashem introduce himself as "The God who took you our of Egypt" rather than the God who created the world?
2. If God's aspect of punishment is 'x' what is his aspect of kindness?
3. What is an example of taking Hashem's name in vain?
4. Besides "Guard" and "Remember" the Shabbat, give an example of two contradictory things that Hashem said simultaneously.
5. How does one "remember" the Shabbat?
6. How can you do all of your work in six days?
7. What Kal Vachomer is taught in the ten commandments?
8. What kind of theft is referred to by "don't steal?" How do we know?
Daily Business Ethics Halacha #14
We are learning from Case Studies in Business Ethics by the late Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine z"l professor of economics at Yeshiva University.
In chapter 2 Rabbi Levine deals with advertising and marketing.
Questions: Should the law protect only reasonable, sensible, and intelligent customers who conduct themselves carefully in the market place? Ir must it also protect ignorant consumers who conduct themselves carelessly?
On this issue American law has gone through a change. Prior to 1914 the governing principle was the reasonable-man standard. Accordingly, an advertiser could not be held liable for misrepresentation unless the court ruled that a reasonable man would rely on the false or deceptive message.
In 1914 the Federal trade Commission (FTC) was established. This independent government agency was given mandate to investigate unfair and predatory competitive practices, and to declare illegal all "unfair methods of competition and commerce." In 1938 its mandate expanded to include preventing false and misleading advertising.
In its early history the FTC broke away from reasonable-man standard and adopted ignorant-man standard. Professor Ivan Preston cites several examples, including a ruling that Clairol was forbidden to say that its hair dye would "color hair permanently." The FTC deemed that the public would take this as a claim that all the hair that a person grew for the rest of their lives would emerge in the Clairol color.
Tomorrow we will discuss what standard Jewish law maintains in advertising.
In chapter 2 Rabbi Levine deals with advertising and marketing.
Questions: Should the law protect only reasonable, sensible, and intelligent customers who conduct themselves carefully in the market place? Ir must it also protect ignorant consumers who conduct themselves carelessly?
On this issue American law has gone through a change. Prior to 1914 the governing principle was the reasonable-man standard. Accordingly, an advertiser could not be held liable for misrepresentation unless the court ruled that a reasonable man would rely on the false or deceptive message.
In 1914 the Federal trade Commission (FTC) was established. This independent government agency was given mandate to investigate unfair and predatory competitive practices, and to declare illegal all "unfair methods of competition and commerce." In 1938 its mandate expanded to include preventing false and misleading advertising.
In its early history the FTC broke away from reasonable-man standard and adopted ignorant-man standard. Professor Ivan Preston cites several examples, including a ruling that Clairol was forbidden to say that its hair dye would "color hair permanently." The FTC deemed that the public would take this as a claim that all the hair that a person grew for the rest of their lives would emerge in the Clairol color.
Tomorrow we will discuss what standard Jewish law maintains in advertising.
Tuesday, February 7, 2012
Daily Busines Ethics Halachah #13
We are learning from Case Studies in Business Ethics by the late Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine z"l professor of economics at Yeshiva University.
Questions: Can a child tell a lie as a means of ending a scuffle amongst his playmates?
Rabbi Levine repeatedly stresses the importance of moral education for children. We learned earlier that lies that may be permitted to adults to maintain domestic harmony are not permitted to children.
However, relating to the question above, Rabbi Levine quotes from the contemporary book Titen emet liyaakov, by Rabbi Yaakov Yechezkel Fish. Rabbi Fish quotes both R' Shlomo Zalman Aurbach and R' Yosef Shalom Elyashiv in saying that it is permissible in the above mentioned case for a child to lie to end an argument with peers. But teachers should stress that the use of permissible lies is only the second best solution to real world problems.
Questions: Can a child tell a lie as a means of ending a scuffle amongst his playmates?
Rabbi Levine repeatedly stresses the importance of moral education for children. We learned earlier that lies that may be permitted to adults to maintain domestic harmony are not permitted to children.
However, relating to the question above, Rabbi Levine quotes from the contemporary book Titen emet liyaakov, by Rabbi Yaakov Yechezkel Fish. Rabbi Fish quotes both R' Shlomo Zalman Aurbach and R' Yosef Shalom Elyashiv in saying that it is permissible in the above mentioned case for a child to lie to end an argument with peers. But teachers should stress that the use of permissible lies is only the second best solution to real world problems.
Monday, February 6, 2012
Daily Business Ethics Halachah #12
We are learning from Case Studies in Business Ethics by the late Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine z"l professor of economics at Yeshiva University.
We have already established that lying to maintain domestic harmony is sometimes permitted. However, the Gemara in Yevamot on 63a seems to contradict this.
The Gemara tells a story about the wife of Rav who spitefully tormented him. "If he asked her to prepare lentils she would prepares peas. If he asked for peas she would prepare lentils." When his son Hiyya grew up he gave her his father's instructions in reverse. "Your mother," remarked Rav to him, "has improved." At that point Hiyya revealed to his father that it was in fact he who had made her seem to improve by reversing the orders. Upon hearing this Rav admonished his son and requested that he stop engaging in falsehood, even for the sake of harmony.
Why was lying not permitted in this case if it helped to bring domestic harmony?
Rav Solomon Luria (Poland, 1510-1573) noted this seeming contradiction. His answer was that the difference between this case and other cases that we mentioned is that this was a habitual lie. To be successful Hiyya had to engage in this ruse for an indefinite period of time which would inevitably have a negative effect on his character.
R. Nahum Yavrov (Israel, contemporary) posits that any falsehood, even for the sake of domestic harmony, must not be used in the presence of children. According to him moral education of children is, in some instances, even more important than domestic harmony.
We have already established that lying to maintain domestic harmony is sometimes permitted. However, the Gemara in Yevamot on 63a seems to contradict this.
The Gemara tells a story about the wife of Rav who spitefully tormented him. "If he asked her to prepare lentils she would prepares peas. If he asked for peas she would prepare lentils." When his son Hiyya grew up he gave her his father's instructions in reverse. "Your mother," remarked Rav to him, "has improved." At that point Hiyya revealed to his father that it was in fact he who had made her seem to improve by reversing the orders. Upon hearing this Rav admonished his son and requested that he stop engaging in falsehood, even for the sake of harmony.
Why was lying not permitted in this case if it helped to bring domestic harmony?
Rav Solomon Luria (Poland, 1510-1573) noted this seeming contradiction. His answer was that the difference between this case and other cases that we mentioned is that this was a habitual lie. To be successful Hiyya had to engage in this ruse for an indefinite period of time which would inevitably have a negative effect on his character.
R. Nahum Yavrov (Israel, contemporary) posits that any falsehood, even for the sake of domestic harmony, must not be used in the presence of children. According to him moral education of children is, in some instances, even more important than domestic harmony.
Sunday, February 5, 2012
Daily Business Ethics Halacha #11
We are learning from Case Studies in Business Ethics by the late Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine z"l professor of economics at Yeshiva University.
Another scenario where retracting a promise is not considered unethical:
If A were to promise B a certain item as a gift for B's birthday in the future, but before the birthday arrives the price of the item rises sharply and A retracts.
The Talmud brings a similar involving a sales transaction. Buyer B and Seller S commit themselves to a sales transaction but before the transaction reaches the point where either B makes a deposit, or the point where the parties would become otherwise legally bound, the price sharply rises and S wishes to retract.
Talmudic authorities dispute whether S's retraction is considered unethical.
Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein (Belarus, 1829-1908) in his authoritative work Aruch Hashulchan rules that S would not be considered untrustworthy in such a case.
Presumably he would rule the same in our birthday case.
Another scenario where retracting a promise is not considered unethical:
If A were to promise B a certain item as a gift for B's birthday in the future, but before the birthday arrives the price of the item rises sharply and A retracts.
The Talmud brings a similar involving a sales transaction. Buyer B and Seller S commit themselves to a sales transaction but before the transaction reaches the point where either B makes a deposit, or the point where the parties would become otherwise legally bound, the price sharply rises and S wishes to retract.
Talmudic authorities dispute whether S's retraction is considered unethical.
Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein (Belarus, 1829-1908) in his authoritative work Aruch Hashulchan rules that S would not be considered untrustworthy in such a case.
Presumably he would rule the same in our birthday case.
Friday, February 3, 2012
Daily Business Ethics Halacha #10
We are learning from Case Studies in Business Ethics by the late Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine z"l professor of economics at Yeshiva University.
"Someone who retracts a verbal commitment is called untrustworthy and a Jewish court will admonish and publicly reprove the offender for this misconduct. Nevertheless, breaking a promise is permissible in certain circumstances. Consider the following scenario:
Person A verbally commits himself to confer B with a largess. Subsequently, A has second thoughts and wishes to retract. Provided A made his commitment in good faith, his subsequent retraction is not unethical. Given the consider expense involved, B presumably never relied on the promise and hence A's retraction should not have dashed B's expectations."
My question on this: does that apply to a pledge made to a charitable organization or a shul? As someone who works for a not for profit, I know that we budget for the future based on pledges made to us by donors. If they were to retract we would be in serious trouble.
"Someone who retracts a verbal commitment is called untrustworthy and a Jewish court will admonish and publicly reprove the offender for this misconduct. Nevertheless, breaking a promise is permissible in certain circumstances. Consider the following scenario:
Person A verbally commits himself to confer B with a largess. Subsequently, A has second thoughts and wishes to retract. Provided A made his commitment in good faith, his subsequent retraction is not unethical. Given the consider expense involved, B presumably never relied on the promise and hence A's retraction should not have dashed B's expectations."
My question on this: does that apply to a pledge made to a charitable organization or a shul? As someone who works for a not for profit, I know that we budget for the future based on pledges made to us by donors. If they were to retract we would be in serious trouble.
Daily Business Ethics Halacha #9
We are learning from Case Studies in Business Ethics by the late Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine z"l professor of economics at Yeshiva University.
Disclosure and Reasonable Expectations in Speculative Transactions:
What constitutes reasonable expectations changes radically when one moves from sale of a consumer good to the sale of a speculative asset. Here, the reasonable expectation is that the entire transaction is made possible only because the seller (S) and the buyer (B) harbor variant and possibly even opposite expectations: B buys because he is convinced that the price will rise and S sells because he thinks it will fall.
Therefore, entry into this market place is accompanied by a warning to the reasonable man that he should research all publicly accessible information on which the trade will be made. If he ignores this warning in whole or in part, he is at his own risk.
Disclosure and Reasonable Expectations in Speculative Transactions:
What constitutes reasonable expectations changes radically when one moves from sale of a consumer good to the sale of a speculative asset. Here, the reasonable expectation is that the entire transaction is made possible only because the seller (S) and the buyer (B) harbor variant and possibly even opposite expectations: B buys because he is convinced that the price will rise and S sells because he thinks it will fall.
Therefore, entry into this market place is accompanied by a warning to the reasonable man that he should research all publicly accessible information on which the trade will be made. If he ignores this warning in whole or in part, he is at his own risk.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Bishalach and Tu bi"Shvat
It is no coincidence that Tu B'Shvat always falls around the week of Parshat B'shalach.
In this week's parshah we read about the Mann, the bread that fell from the sky, that our ancestors ate for 40 years in the desert. According to the Rambam the greatest of all miracles mentioned in the Torah is the manner in which Hashem provided for us in the desert.
But if you think about it, really all food is a great miracle from Hashem - no less then the Mann. In the words of Rabbi Avigdor Miller:
I hope everyone has a happy and meaningful Tu B'Shvat!
In this week's parshah we read about the Mann, the bread that fell from the sky, that our ancestors ate for 40 years in the desert. According to the Rambam the greatest of all miracles mentioned in the Torah is the manner in which Hashem provided for us in the desert.
But if you think about it, really all food is a great miracle from Hashem - no less then the Mann. In the words of Rabbi Avigdor Miller:
Hashem causes the food to result from the combined action of water, sunlight, carbon-dioxide, and soil. Carbon-dioxide is but three parts of ten thousand of the air, and the plant would immediately exhaust the surrounding air of its carbon-dioxide if not for the marvel of wind that moves air around and thus ensures a constant supply. The light comes from the sun which is 93 million miles away, but it speeds at 186,000 miles per second to reach the plant to perform the miracle of photosynthesis. Thousands of steps are performed in the production of food, each in precise sequence and according to a precise chemical process. This process is no less miraculously designed and executed than the falling of the Mann.The episode of the Mann and the holiday of Tu B'Shvat are annual reminders of the greatest miracle - the food we eat. But once a year is not nearly enough. That is why we have brachot that we say before we eat. Brachot are not only a way to thank Hashem, they are also a way to draw our attention to the miracle of the food that came from the ground so that we may better appreciate the great kindnesses that Hashem provides for us every second.
I hope everyone has a happy and meaningful Tu B'Shvat!
Daily Business Ethics Halacha #8
We are learning from Case Studies in Business Ethics by the late Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine z"l professor of economics at Yeshiva University.
Question: is capitalizing on an informational advantage that one has over another person immoral?
Halachah's disclosure obligation is geared towards the expectations of a hypothetical reasonable person in that position. What constitutes reasonable expectations will depend on the type of transaction that is being conducted. In a face to face transaction the seller is not responsible to point out to the buyer the visibly obvious defects in a product. The reasonable expectation is that the buyer will see the flaws without the seller having to specifically point them out to him.
Hence, voiding or adjusting the terms of a concluded transaction on the basis of visibly obvious flaws is not entertained by a Jewish court.
Question: is capitalizing on an informational advantage that one has over another person immoral?
Halachah's disclosure obligation is geared towards the expectations of a hypothetical reasonable person in that position. What constitutes reasonable expectations will depend on the type of transaction that is being conducted. In a face to face transaction the seller is not responsible to point out to the buyer the visibly obvious defects in a product. The reasonable expectation is that the buyer will see the flaws without the seller having to specifically point them out to him.
Hence, voiding or adjusting the terms of a concluded transaction on the basis of visibly obvious flaws is not entertained by a Jewish court.
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